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Nishida on the Role of Religion
Translated and Introduced by GEREON KOPF
Introduction
THE present essay introduces two minor passages from the lectures on “Religious Studies”1 Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) gave between August 
1913 and August 1914 at Kyoto University. While Nishida’s lecture notes are 
largely ignored by Nishida scholarship in general, not the least because they 
were reconstructed from notes by his students,2 these two passages especial­
ly provide a unique key to Nishida’s philosophy of religion in particular and 
his philosophical approach and system in general. In short, the lectures not 
only offer one of the few relatively systematic readings Nishida provides of 
the main philosophers, but they also reveal his general method of reading and 
doing philosophy. Such a method is especially important since his philoso-
* This translation would not have been possible, had it not been for a generous post-doc­
toral fellowship from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. I would also like to thank 
James Heisig, Matsumoto Kybko, and Obara Shizuka for their invaluable comments and 
insights.
1 The title of Nishida’s lectures on religion “Shukyogaku” (AS^) comprises the Japanese 
translation of the German term “Religionswissenschaft” and its English rendition “Science of 
Religion.” While the former is still in use, the latter was replaced by the term “Religious 
Studies” in the middle of the last century. I decided to translate the Japanese original as this, 
since the term “science” today carries connotations that are difficult to reconcile with the 
academic project of shukydgaku and religious studies. The complete lecture notes can be 
found in Nishida Kitaro Zenshii (The collected Works of Nishida Kitaro, hereafter abbreviat­
ed as NKZ), vol. 15, pp. 221-381.
2 Nishida credits Hisamatsu Shin’ichi (1889-1980) with taking notes and cross-checking 
them as well as preparing the manuscript for “Religious Studies.” (NKZ, vol. 15, pp. i-ii).
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phy generally lives up to its reputation of not being easily accessible or read­
er-friendly even to the professional philosopher. In particular, as many read­
ers of Nishida will agree, his thought is obscured rather than illuminated by 
his pervasive use of paradoxical language and mantra-like repetition of the 
non-dual paradigm. He commits himself to this practice to such a degree that 
his philosophy more often than not, seems to dissolve all concepts and ideas 
into a universal oneness or, more appropriately, the “self-identity of the 
absolute contradictories” ). However, this is not so. Not
only does Nishida reject the standpoints of monism and pantheism through­
out his work,3 the two sections translated here provide a key to his philo­
sophical methodology and an application to the non-dual paradigm. The first 
excerpt, entitled “The Standpoint that Sets Up the Unique Norm of Religion,” 
introduces a heuristic device that explains 
Nishida’s predilection for the non-dual paradigm and paradoxical language 
and offers a key to his philosophy, which is best identified as the dialectics 
of the middle way. The second one, “The Relationship of Religion to 
Scholarship and Morality,” provides a superb applica­
tion of his non-dual principle to the discussion of the role religion plays in 
relation to other human endeavors, such as scholarship and morality, with a 
special focus on the often assumed incompatibility of science and religion. In 
short, Nishida suggests that scholarship and religion are not only compatible 
but necessitate each other; this essay thus facilitates a solution to the latter 
problem usually not considered.
Since the translation contains two excerpts, I would like to briefly intro­
duce their context. In his lectures on “Religious Studies,” Nishida sets out to 
argue that the “religious demand” is the most central “demand” of human 
existence. This theme he had already developed in his Inquiry Into the Good 
There, he suggests that the “religious demand” com­
prises the “demand of life” that underlies all human
activities. To explain this notion, Nishida strives to undermine the dualisms 
that dominate, in his mind, the four major philosophical discourses, namely 
the dichotomy of thought and will in epistemology, nature and spirit in ontol-
3 Nishida makes this point, for example, in NKZ, vol. 10, p. 491; vol. 11, p. 398; vol. 11, 
p. 450 and, more indirectly, in NKZ, vol. 1, pp. 173-196, where he suggests a middle way 
between pantheism and theism.
4 NKZ, vol. 15, pp. 289-296.
5 Ibid., pp. 331-335.
6 NKZ, vol. 1, p. 169.
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ogy, heteronomy and autonomy in ethics, and theism and pantheism in philo­
sophical theology or the philosophy of religion. In this context, it is impor­
tant to realize that Nishida does not aim at presenting a satisfactory picture of 
mainstream philosophy, but rather points to what he considers the funda­
mental problem of the philosophical discourse. Nishida suggests that this 
problem lies in the reliance on a binary worldview and its assumptions that 
reality is divided into two completely distinct worlds. He questions this dual­
ism inherent in mainstream philosophy and postulates a “unifying power” 
—Jj), which underlies the above-mentioned dichotomies. In this sense, 
thought and will, nature and spirit are not mutually exclusive but rather com­
prise two aspects of the same cognitive activity in the case of epistemology, 
and reality in that of ontology. This unifying activity Nishida identifies as the 
content of religion. He calls it, not unlike Paul Tillich’s (1886-1965) “ulti­
mate concern” (was uns unbedingt angeht)1 and John Hutchinson’s “ultimate 
value,”7 8 the “demand of life” to drive home the point that religion addresses 
the most fundamental and all-pervasive dimension of human existence. It is 
in his lectures on “Religious Studies,” that he systematically develops this 
notion of the “most fundamental demand.”
7 Tillich 1958, pp. 19-21.
8 Hutchinson 1969, pp. 5-9.
9 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 291.
In the section preceding the one translated here, Nishida applies the 
Platonic triad of “the truth, the good, and the beautiful” which con­
stitutes a recurring theme in his philosophy, and its epistemic equivalent, the 
triad of “knowledge, feeling, and will” (®'IW<),9 to the nineteenth century 
European search for the “essence of religion” in order to explore the ultimate 
concern and deepest demand of human existence. In short, Nishida contends 
that the “religious demand” transcends and, simultaneously, grounds the 
“intellectual demand” the “aesthetic demand” (fWiHgsk), and the
“moral demand” (iSSWgjR). The goal of his project is rather obvious. If he 
can argue that the religious demand really does underlie and transcend the 
other aspects of human existence, he will have accomplished two basic goals. 
First, he has made the case that religion does pervade all aspects of human 
existence. Second, he has successfully rejected all forms of reductionism that 
limit religion to intellect, aesthetics and morality and, subsequently, has 
proven the inadequacy of the respective philosophies. To accomplish just that, 
Nishida proceeds in two steps. First, he identifies the medieval scholastic the­
ology exemplified by Anselm of Canterbury’s (1033-1109) ontological proof
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of the existence of god as “the normative intellectual consciousness” (®WS 
illicit), Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury’s (1671-1713) “religious 
enthusiasm” which unites and grounds “aesthetic matters” and “religious 
matters” and, at the same time, “harmonizes the intellectual and the moral 
demand”10 as “the normative aesthetic consciousness” (JIKSil&It), and 
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der 
Praktischen Vernunft) as the prototype of a “normative moral consciousness” 
(IMlSSWiKIt). Second, Nishida rejects all three approaches as insufficient. 
Regarding the first position, he argues that, in addition to the arguments, espe­
cially the four antinomies Kant presented in his Critique of Pure Reason 
(Kritik der Reinen Vernunft) to thwart any attempt to “intellectually” grasp 
metaphysical matters,11 the “intellectual demand” lacks the emotional and 
experiential dimension necessary to the religious enterprise. Second, Nishida 
believes that Kant’s three critiques have sufficiently demonstrated that the 
intellectual, the aesthetic, and moral standpoints cannot simply collapse into 
one but demand their own “reason.” Finally, the “moral demand” suffers from 
the dualism characteristic of Kant’s position; that is, a dualism between 
“pure” and “practical” thinking, between metaphysics and ethics. 
Analogically, Nishida concludes that the religious demand cannot be reduced 
to “faith” (IMP), “religious feelings” as in the case of Friedrich
10 Ibid., pp. 283-84.
11 Nishida fashions his term “intellectual demand” in the narrow sense of Kant’s “pure rea­
son,” which is distinguished from “practical” and “aesthetic” reason, and Nishida’s moral and 
aesthetic demands.
12 Nishida borrows the term “antinomy” obviously from Kant’s first Critique. However, 
Nishida tends to use this term to indicate any irreconcilable contradiction that points beyond 
the world of knowledge, his “universal of judgment.”
Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), or “religious activity”
^) such as rituals. Most importantly, however, Nishida argues that all three 
standpoints are incapable of solving the inherent “antinomy”12 and, one could 
add, ambiguities of the religious discourse in particular and human existence 
in general.
In short, all three criteria, as well as all of the philosophies that represent 
the various approaches, fail to account for the religious phenomenon. Not only 
that, they also give an incomplete picture of the human predicament. To dis­
cuss the ground of human existence in “The Standpoint that Sets Up the 
Unique Norm of Religion,” Nishida suggests that these three demands actu­
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ally symbolize the two basic aspects of human existence: intellect and aes­
thetics, symbolizing the objectivist standpoint, which I usually refer to as the 
world of knowledge; morality, the standpoint of subjectivity to the world of 
engagement.13 Assuming the former standpoint, the scholar pretends to stand 
outside of the world and analyzes it from a neutral and, subsequently, seem­
ingly objective place. This perspective allows for analysis, but assumes a dis­
tance between self and the world that in reality does not exist. The latter 
standpoint gives, due to the fact that even scholars are involved in the world, 
but concedes that subjectivity makes analysis impossible. In the present sec­
tion, Nishida compares this situation to a play; the world of knowledge is thus 
symbolized by the audience that watches the play from a disengaged per­
spective, while the world of engagement is symbolized by the actors, who are 
actively involved in the performance of the play, but lack the angle, Nishida 
says “the space,” to reflectively process it. Elsewhere, he applies the same 
model to the role of the historian who lives within history yet, at the same 
time, pretends to analyze it from the outside.14 In short, the predicament of 
the reflective individual is highly ambiguous insofar as she/he occupies the 
standpoints of subjectivity and objectivity—that is, involvement in and dis­
engagement from the world—at the same time. This existential ambiguity is 
expressed in the religious demand, which, according to Nishida, provides the 
unity of subjectivity and objectivity. In other words, the religious demand 
overcomes and mends the dichotomies and divisions within human existence 
and permits the individual to simultaneously be a participant and an observ­
er in the great play called life. Using this analogy, Nishida has successfully 
reduced the variety of theories on religious phenomenon to two fundamental 
positions and applied them to the problem he is most interested in, that is, the 
problem of dualism. In addition, he has managed to introduce religion as the 
source of the non-dual paradigm and to identify his own position, as the title 
of his last finished volume confirms, as the standpoint of religion.15
13 In his article “The World of Intelligibility” (SXlaWtklr) (NKZ, vol. 5, pp. 123-185), 
Nishida identifies the realms of objective thought and subjective activity as the “universals of 
judgment” (^©rW—SxW) and “self-awareness” (§ SxW) respectively. I renamed them 
“worlds of knowledge” and “engagement” to take them out of the narrow context of the epis­
temological discourse, in which Nishida framed these terms, and make them applicable to a 
wider range of issues.
14 NKZ, vol. 12, p. 55.
15 The title of his last completed work reads “77ie Logic of Basho and the Religious
Worldview.” NKZ,vol. 11, pp. 371-464.
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Subsequently, religion constitutes not one phenomenon among many 
(scholarship, aesthetics, and morality), but their ground and the relationship 
among them. What this means is that, to Nishida, religion thematizes the 
awareness of the framework that grounds scholarship and morality, but lies 
outside their respective domains; in addition, religion embraces the ambigu­
ities these specific standpoints evoke. Due to its particularity, an individual 
standpoint, be it the standpoint of objectivity assumed by scholarship or that 
of the subjectivity of morality, loses sight of the totality and the ambiguity of 
human existence. The latter reduces it to either the aspect of objectivity or 
subjectivity and thereby denies the twofold dimension of the individual that 
is, at the same time, separate from yet belonging to the totality. At the same 
time, the individual self constitutes, simultaneously, the subject and the object 
of all human activity, but especially knowledge, be it scholarship or the sim­
ple awareness of oneself. In short, religion does not constitute a set of beliefs 
and practices, neither does it constitute social institutions, but rather an aware­
ness of this inherent ambiguity of human existence. Nishida calls this aware­
ness “the religious heart” (SSStl,')-16 He further describes this heart as the awe, 
caused by knowledge of the world and as the act, not the content, of faith, 
which scholarship and morality both require. In the case of scholarship, this 
act of faith is engendered by the recognition that there is no absolutely objec­
tive standpoint and that every standpoint is relative to its opposite as well as 
its historical context. The terminology of the religious heart does not refer to 
any of these particular standpoints but to the awareness that any particular 
position is bound to be relative and incomplete, especially when seen in the 
context of an all-encompassing totality. It is thus more appropriately called, 
to paraphrase the popular rhetoric frequently associated with the thought of 
the Kyoto School and Zen thinkers such asD.T. Suzuki (1870-1966) and Abe 
Masao, the “standpoint of no standpoint.” In the case of morality, the act of 
faith manifests itself in the abandonment of the self to the engagement, which 
in the ideal scenario is paramount to the loss of one’s self to the context of 
the totality. To Nishida, this context of totality is not completely transcendent 
but rather refers to the relationship of an individual to another, to the society, 
and to the environment. Nishida refers to this act of abandonment alterna­
tively by citing the famous line from Dogen’s (1200-1253) Shobogenzd 
Genjokdan , “to study the self is to forget the self—to forget
16 Ibid.
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the self is to be actualized by myriad dharmas”17 or by using his own termi­
nology of the “inverse correlation”18 (igWJA), that is, the human response to 
Amida Buddha’s “other-power” Both terminologies indicate that the
17 Dogen 1993-4, vol. 1, p. 95.
181 borrow this translation from Heisig 2001, p. 99.
19 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 333.
selfs isolation from, and opposition to, the totality in the case of Dogen, and 
the absolute other in that of Shinran iW (1173-1262), are overcome. 
Nishida’s use of religious terminology indicates his belief that the act of faith, 
necessary for both scholarship and morality, can only be expressed in sym­
bolic language and cannot be expressed otherwise.
This sentiment becomes especially obvious in the second section, “The 
Relationship of Religion to Scholarship and Morality.” Here, Nishida argues 
in extremely strong terms that religion can never be at odds with scholarship, 
especially science and morality; to the contrary, they support each other. They 
cannot be at odds, because knowledge about the world falls into the domain 
of scholarship, while engagement with the world falls into that of morality. 
One’s place within the play and the world, as well as the existential ambigu­
ity experienced by the individual within these domains, is essentially a reli­
gious matter. While statements such as “if both, scholarship and morality, on 
one side, and religion, on the other, guard their domains, they are not in con­
flict” might be read to suggest a dualism between science and religion, they 
in fact do not. On the contrary, while Nishida acknowledges the existence and 
necessity of distinct domains, he always adds that they are insolubly inter­
twined. To him, scientific knowledge fosters religious faith and vice versa. 
Conflicts arise when religion is mistaken as a source of knowledge about the 
world and, respectively, scholarship as a tool to avert spiritual and existential 
crises. The key lines in this section are those that proclaim that Galileo Galilei 
(1564-1642) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882), criticized by the church of 
their time as heretics, were more religious than those who questioned their 
religiosity. While the controversy about evolution might be considered an 
issue of the past in most parts of the world (and even the U.S.A.), today’s 
issues on which religious fervor or fanaticism oversteps, as Nishida would 
say, its “domain” include abortion, stem cell research, the issue of sexual pref­
erence and equal rights for same sex partners. As Nishida notices rather blunt­
ly, “moral law should not be determined by religious authority.”19 A religion 
that is threatened by knowledge about the world and by considerations about 
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morality cannot be authentic; by the same token, religion should not be iden­
tified with the adherence to dogmas but rather with the quest for knowledge 
and the desire to be moral.
Assertions such as these, make it unmistakably clear that Nishida breaks 
with most conventional definitions of religion. To him, religion has nothing 
to do with faith, religious institutions, morality, or even rituals. This way, he 
ignores polythetic definitions of religion based on family resemblance,20 such 
as the notorious “four Cs” of creed, community, code, and cult that are fre­
quently cited by textbooks as the basic features of “religion.” In addition, his 
pronouncements that “religion comprises the relationship between god and 
humans”21 and that “god constitutes the fundamental concept of religion”22 
are misleading at best, since his conception of god does not show any affin­
ity to the god of the theologies (such as the Pauline theology) he cites in sup­
port of his position.23 As he suggests in his lectures, “the essence of religion 
comprises the union between humans and god. God constitutes the objectiv­
ity of the cosmos, the self its subjectivity.”24 “God” and “the self’ merely 
symbolize two extreme aspects of human experience. To Nishida, religion is 
not concerned with the relationship between transcendence and immanence 
or even between god—in the theistic sense—and humans; on the contrary, his 
concept of the “religious heart” indicates an existential attitude. Ultimately, 
“god” symbolizes nothing but the obliteration of the self.25 Similarly “faith,” 
to Nishida, signifies an existential attitude that discards the self and embraces 
a more holistic rather than exclusive and subjective standpoint. The sense of 
the religious commences with the awareness of one’s own impotence, fragili­
ty, and impermanence. Since his words in this regard are especially strong, I 
would like to cite them here: the religious feeling arises “when we realize our 
own impotence and triviality in solitude or in the silence of broad daylight. 
... Again, when we are in solitude or in the silence of broad daylight or when 
we face the vastness of the ocean, the awareness of our triviality and impo­
tence weighs heavily upon us. In other words, we feel that we are bound and 
20 For a discussion of these kinds of definitions, see Wilson 1998, pp. 141-162.
21 NKZ, vol. 1, p. 173.
22 NKZ, vol. 11, p. 372.
23 A minor fact he only acknowledges in The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview, 
where he delineates his thought from that of Karl Barth (NKZ,vol. 11, p. 398).
24 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 332.
25 Literally, Nishida suggests that “when we encounter god we die” (NKZ, vol. 11, p. 396).
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confined indescribably in the mystical totality of life.”26 Elsewhere, he sug­
gests that “the religious heart is not bom out of the procession from the finite 
to the Infinite or from the relative to the Absolute, as many people think; on 
the contrary we become conscious of it when our own existence is called into 
question and becomes problematic.. .The problem of religion is not a matter 
of values. It rather implies that the existence of the self becomes problemat­
ic at the moment when we become conscious of the deep self-contradiction 
at the bottom of our selves, or, alternatively, when we are aware that our exis­
tence is self-contradictory.”2' These sentences clearly illustrate why for the 
later Nishida, Fydor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky (1821-1881) and Shinran 
model the religious heart. To Nishida, religion is bom out of an existential 
struggle to come to terms with one’s place in nature and society, the two faces 
of the historical world. It takes as its content, the awe scholarship and moral­
ity evoke in the individual and the recognition that we stand engulfed by a 
totality that is there even though it consistently escapes our grasp. The rest is 
accessory.
26 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 295.
27 NKZ, vol. 11, p. 393.
28 “When those two approaches are identical, true religion arises.... The religions of other-
power and self-power (§Tj) become one when taken to their respective extremes”
(NKZ, vol. 15, p. 330).
Drawing such a picture of religion, Nishida does bring to life some of the 
implications of religion of the non-dualist paradigm for philosophy. It is, of 
course, no surprise that a non-dualist philosophy questions a fossilized 
dichotomy of transcendence and immanence, the sacred and the profane, as 
he does explicitly so in his The Logic ofBasho and the Religious Worldview. 
However, already in the section that precedes “The Relationship of Religion 
to Scholarship and Morality,” Nishida concludes his analysis of various mod­
els of religious categories with the dry observation that there is really no dis­
tinction between these two categories in general or between the religions of 
other-power and those of self-power in particular.28 While Nishida borrows 
the latter terms from Shinran’s polemic against Tendai Buddhism, he uses 
them to contrast True Pure Land Buddhism with Zen Buddhism and, ulti­
mately, to function as the prototypes of all religious categories. What is more 
interesting, however, is that Nishida’s philosophy of religion actually pro­
vides the thought structure to theories of religion that are very contemporary. 
Not only can his concepts such as the “transcendent immanence,” “imma­
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nence in the form of transcendence,” and “eschatology of the everyday,”29 
accommodate phenomena such as civil and cultural religions, they also res­
onate with the notion of “this-worldly transcendence,”30 used by several post­
modern theorists of religion. Finally, they offer a way out of the alleged 
incompatibility between religion and science, which was based on the dual­
istic philosophies of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), and offer a way to reconcile them without having to sacrifice 
scientific discoveries to religious dogma or the religious heart to the alleged 
objectivity of rational thought.
29 While Nishida does not employ this term as such, he implies it twice. First, he asserts that 
Rinzai’s (®W) words “should not be misunderstood. They indicate that the eschatological 
appears in the form of the everyday.” He then equates his own expression with the title of the 
thirtieth case of the Mumonkan (SSMM) “the mind is the Buddha” (T'EPzeIA) (NKZ, vol. 11, 
p. 446). Six pages later, he combines the terms “eschatological” and “everyday” again in a 
somewhat cryptic statement that reads something like “I talk eschatologically about every­
dayness” (NKZ, vol. 11, p. 454).
30 Bauman 1988, p. 69.
31 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 290.
32 NKZ, vol. 15, p. 291.
Finally, I would like to add a quick note about the translation. Since the 
text is reconstructed from notes gathered by Nishida’s students, it frequently 
lacks flow and discloses leaps in thought larger than usual, even by Nishida’s 
standards. In addition, the editors frequently included explanations in paren­
thesis. To make the text accessible to the reader, I have tried to provide bridges 
without straying too far from the original text. Whenever necessary, I have 
indicated these additions with brackets. The fact that the text is based on lec­
ture notes might have also contributed to what seems, at first sight, to be a 
glaring contradiction in “The Standpoint that Sets Up the Unique Norm of 
Religion.” While Nishida claims that “religious emotion is secondary”31 in 
the beginning of the essay, he later suggests that “the religious emotion is the 
most central among our emotions.” He follows the latter observation with the 
not necessarily helpful comment that, giving a literal translation, “even if we 
were to say that the religious feeling is secondary, it is secondary only inso­
far as the claim that the religious feeling is central, is secondary.”32 While 
there could be a host of possible reasons for this problem, ranging from a mis­
understanding by the students to an inconsistency on the part of Nishida, it 
does disappear when one attributes two meanings to the term “secondary.” 
From a methodological perspective, we can say that “religious emotion” and 
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“the claim that it is central” are both secondary in the sense of being derived. 
This is to say that in this essay, he derives the concept of “religious emotion” 
methodologically from his observation that the present (in Nishida’s time) 
theories of religion, privileging the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral para­
digms, are incapable of not only accommodating the religious phenomenon, 
but also of coherently dealing with what he considers the most fundamental 
existential dilemma. In short, Nishida contends that the human predicament 
discloses an inherent ambiguity that cannot be reduced to one particular 
standpoint or an easy formula. My translation reflects such considerations. 
Be that as it may, in the end, I hope, the reader will not be turned away by the 
terseness of Nishida’s language or by the imperfections in my translation, 
because I believe that his insights on the role of religion, based on the non­
dual paradigm, still have value today.
Translation
1. The Standpoint that Sets Up the Unique Norm of Religion
Some consider that religion cannot be deduced from any of the three previ­
ously discussed norms of human existence [that is, from the intellectual, the 
aesthetic, or the moral demand], but has to be sought elsewhere. Therefore, I 
would like to discuss Hoffding’s33 Philosophy of Religion, a representative 
of the psychological approach to the search for the religious norm. According 
to him, pleasure and pain engender certain kinds of value. In short, everything 
that bestows pleasure or pain possesses some kind of value for us.34
33 Harald Hoffding (1843-1931).
34 In his Religionsphilosophie, Harald Hoffding uses the notion of Wert, “value,” as a heuris­
tic device to introduce an epistemological, a psychological, and an ethical approach to the phi­
losophy of religion. Wilhelm Windelband, whom Nishida refers to frequently in the present 
excerpt, similarly assigns the notion of “value” a central role in the chapter of his 
Religionsphilosophie that deals with ethics and religion.
All feelings of pleasure and pain express some value. In other words, the objects 
of instant gratification, as well as anything that bestows meaning to these [objects], 
possess a value for us. This value presupposes and precedes the subject that feels 
pleasure or pain. In other words, it provides us with the conditions [that give rise 
to these emotions] as well as with their content. By the same token, it forms a spe­
cific relationship to the subject, that is, the subject that feels pleasure and pain. We 
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derive the quintessence of this value from the nature of the conditions and content 
particular to our emotions.35
35 Hereafter, following the style of NKZ, the indented paragraphs in smaller type are 
Nishida’s own lecture notes used by the editors in the reconstruction.
j6 Here, Nishida evokes once again the fundamental distinction between subjectivity and 
objectivity, which, as the next essay will demonstrate in religious language, is symbolized by 
the self and god and systematized as self-power religion or Other Power religion.
We have many emotions. Some of them are, for example, based on the feel­
ing of self-preservation, others on the love for our neighbor. Religious val­
ues arise along with the question of whether these two kinds of forces can be 
maintained in the same realm of existence. In other words, the world can be 
understood as a struggle among various values; the various dimensions of 
human existence decide the outcome of this competition in the present 
moment. In this sense, we can compare our existence in the world with a play. 
In this play, we, human beings, not only constitute the audience, but also par­
ticipate in the play as performers. If we observe the drama of this world from 
the standpoint of the audience, only the intellectual and aesthetic feelings 
arise. On the contrary, if we simply participate in the performance, we are 
completely absorbed in it and any place for reflection upon the performance 
itself is eliminated. This means that only the feeling of morality arises. 
However, because we simultaneously perform in and observe the play, the 
question of whether or not the object of our passions and desire, that is, our 
ideal, prevails in the contest to decide the dominant paradigm in this world, 
stirs our emotion; this we call religious emotion. Many values compete to 
exist in this world. Religious emotion arises from this competition. For this 
reason, we can say that religious emotion is secondary and derivative. 
However, religious emotion is not weak, but is felt as strongly as the domi­
nant emotion. In some cases, the religious value constitutes the center of 
everything. (This means that when we consider the fate of these values in the 
world in which we work, religious emotion can be found).
The differences among the various values [that guide our decisions] are due to 
the differences among the various emotions they correspond to. Some values are 
connected to self-assertion, others to the devotion to another.36 Moral, aesthetic, 
and intellectual emotions alike are not limited to self-preservation, [but must have 
a social dimension as well].
The religious value (that is, the third kind of value) depends on whether or not 
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it is possible to maintain the co-existence of the previous two values [that is, the 
intellectual/aesthetic and the moral] in the present moment. We can discover this 
religious value in the place where the fates of the other (intellectual, aesthetic, and 
moral) values are determined. In the great play of life, we participate as both actors 
and spectators. If we were simply spectators facing the unfolding of the play, our 
standpoint would be purely intellectual and aesthetic. Again, if we were simply 
performers, we would sink into our roles and there would be no place from which 
the unfolding of the play could be observed. However, since we are both actors 
and spectators, we act and, at the same time, observe the unfolding of the play.
[When the standpoints of subjectivity and objectivity coincide], we are drawn 
into the innermost center of our selves and, because it is the highest value we know, 
we gain insight into the order and the transition of all events at such a moment. 
This experience has to be understood in analogy to the way the emotions of pain 
and pleasure arise in our midst when the fate of these values is decided. The feel­
ing that arises from the fate of the values in their struggle to survive, we call reli­
gious emotion. Religious emotion is defined by [and dependent on] its relationship 
to these values in their realized form. (It constitutes the feeling that arises in 
response to the fate of the highest ideal).
Regardless of the fact that we encounter it in the form of various deviations, the 
religious sentiment is felt strongly and directly as if it did exist in its pure form. 
The religious emotion constitutes the central value in our lives. Consequently, the 
self tries to maintain it with all of its energy. Even if we were to say that the reli­
gious feeling is secondary, we would be only implying that the observation “the 
religious feeling is central,” is derived [from other phenomena of human exis­
tence].
Real religious emotions arise bearing the mark of perfect totality. Yet, religious 
emotion develops the same way that instinct does.
In his Religionsphilosophie, Windelband takes this thought even one step 
further.3' He locates the norm of religion outside of the true, the good, and 
the beautiful, that is, outside the norms of the intellect, emotion, and the will. 
In short, he assigns the sacred to a special domain. Nevertheless, religion pos­
sesses an intimate relationship to these three practical standards. Sometimes, 
religion is thought to refer to the truth; at other times, to designate moral orga­
nizations or artistic artifacts. However, religion does not simply constitute 
knowledge, life (that is, morality), and creativity. Rather, that which cannot 37
37 The editors insert here (NKZ, vol.15, p. 291) the character for “sacred” (ffi) in parenthe­
sis, probably to identify Chapter 20, “Das Heilige,” of Windelband 1920.
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be exhausted by these three norms is included in religion. What is this? It con­
stitutes the moment that includes and transcends the various cultural func­
tions of intellect, morality, and art in the world. Religion possesses the content 
that transcends human beings and this world. What is the content of religion 
thus defined? Is there something within the bounds of our reason that corre­
sponds to the content of religion? (The demand that reaches the extremes of 
the true, the good, and the beautiful constitutes the religious demand).
It is necessary that the content of religion transcends human beings and the 
world. Of course, such a content must be identical with the sacred. At the same 
time, that which transcends human beings and this world, must be deduced from 
an essence inherent in reason itself.
Knowledge, feeling, and the will constitute the activities of our psyche. 
However, if these phenomena did exhaust human experience, the true, the 
good, and the beautiful would be sufficient to function as norms for the spir­
itual capacity of humans. However, the sacred does not coincide with these 
norms. On the contrary, it constitutes the basic relationship among them and 
the basis on which the ideals of the true, the good, and the beautiful stand. In 
short, it comprises the antinomy of consciousness. There is an antinomy in 
the middle of our consciousness, that is, the antinomy between the ought and 
the necessary, between the norm and the natural law. This antinomy appears 
universally in the case of the true, the good, and the beautiful, and constitutes 
the content of the religious norm. (In other words, anyone who really under­
stands the antinomy between the ought and the necessary, is inherently reli­
gious).
We can identify representation, desire, and emotion as our psychological activ­
ities and logic, morality, and aesthetics as their norms. The sacred does not belong 
to the same category of nouns. Philosophy of religion evolves from these three 
norms and the fundamental relationship among them. It problematizes the ground 
of the intellectual, the aesthetic, and the moral nonns and their status as facts [of 
human experience].
In each of these normative consciousnesses, we can always detect a contradic­
tion. In other words, in the relationship between psychological reality and the 
norm, between reality and the ideal, between the arising of temporality and the 
validity of atemporality, we can identify a contradiction.
The consciousness of the antinomy arises for the first time in the form of 
guilt. When we reflect within our hearts, the thought that we are evil natural­
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ly arises. This awareness marks the beginning of religious consciousness. 
Those, who have an extremely shallow conscience, assume that our mistakes 
are not necessary to our nature and that it is only by chance that they are iden­
tified as our mistakes. They believe that because our mistakes are not related 
to our essence, we can escape them sooner or later, even if in a case where 
we actually commit an error. A shallow conscience suggests that an error 
occurs by accident, that it is unrelated to our essence, and that we will not 
commit the error twice. While this may be so, the feeling of guilt is necessary 
to our essence. Kant says that committing a sin implies that “because you are 
presently a certain kind of person, you act in a certain kind of way.” A vio­
lation of rules is necessary to our essence as is our obedience to them.
We can thus identify a normative consciousness at the basis unifying the intel­
lectual, aesthetic, and moral consciousnesses. Even if we desired to cease its activ­
ity, we would not be able to do so. In fact, this consciousness constitutes our 
essence, and thus somehow functions perpetually.
We recognize that the antinomy is necessary to our essence not only 
through the feeling of guilt in the normative consciousness of morality but 
through all three normative consciousnesses. In fact, if any normative con­
sciousness forms to even the slightest degree, it is accompanied by an antin­
omy. Therefore, it is possible to identify the awareness of the antinomy, on 
which any normative consciousness is based, as religious consciousness. 
Similarly, the expression “religious life” indicates that we are aware of the 
normative consciousness that grounds the true, the good, and the beautiful 
within the experience of the self. It is for this reason that we experience the 
transcendent. Religious life possesses a transcendent dimension. To be exact, 
the term “religious life” explicates that we proceed from concrete experience 
to an infinite ideal and that we belong to the realm constituted by the values 
of the transcendent spirit beyond experience. By the same token, what we call 
the “transcendent life of religion” indicates that we long to see the end of the 
empirical world and thus transcend it. In other words, one stretches out 
towards the world beyond [everyday] experience38 to live therein.
38 Nishida’s JT,” literally “the trans-empirical world,” is not only a mouthful, it
raises significant questions, since it suggests a new kind of experience beyond the empirical 
realm. To avoid this conceptual conundrum of suggesting an experience beyond experience, I 
decided to distinguish between two kinds of experience, the experience of the everyday and 
that of what transcends everyday consciousness.
233
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST XXXV, 1 & 2
The necessity of the antinomy between the ought and the necessary transcends 
the individual consciousness of guilt. We feel this antinomy not only within the 
individual consciousness but within all normative consciousnesses.
Yet, this antagonism cannot be explained by theories of psychological devel­
opment. Such an explanation would assume the existence of a normative con­
sciousness inside the self.
For this reason, the religious demand begins with the feeling of transcen­
dence. That means it appears in the form of emotions. Windelband said that 
Schleiermacher’s words often evoke the essence of religion. Schleiermacher 
identifies religion as the feeling of absolute dependence. Religion indicates 
the dependence on the cosmic totality our words cannot express. It appears 
as dependence on the totality, which is hard to grasp. Such a feeling arises 
when we realize our own impotence and triviality in solitude or in the silence 
of broad daylight. This is the beginning of religious emotion.
Again, when we are in solitude or in the silence of broad daylight or when we 
face the vastness of the ocean, the awareness of our triviality and impotence weighs 
heavily upon us. At the same time, we feel that we are bound and confined inde­
scribably by the mystical totality of life. But the individual feeling that expresses 
this dependence on the transcendent arises in an even clearer form when we reflect 
upon the relationship between normative consciousness and individual life.
Nonns make us aware of our impotence. At the same time, we sense an even 
deeper need for salvation. We feel remorse, regret, and repentance. Moreover, we 
experience the first emergence of the nonnative consciousness in the moment of 
conversion as well as in the frustration over our failure. This first recognition takes 
on the fonn of revelation. It comes in the form of a manifestation of the transcen­
dent in ourselves. We experience it as a miracle or grace. For this reason, the power 
that judges us in the form of our own conscience constitutes, at the same time, the 
power that grants us salvation.
However, religion is not simply exhausted by our emotions. To the con­
trary, their content is not very clear. Therefore, wherever religious con­
sciousness develops, it is always accompanied by an effort to clarify the object 
of this transcendental emotion. To express this object, religious thinkers 
choose adequate symbolic content. It is thus possible to say that the symbol 
of the transcendent has its roots in transcendental emotion. In other words, 
this emotion marks the beginning of the religious concept. The inscrutable 
object of emotion is expressed in eidetic form as the god of religion. For this 
reason, god cannot appear in a determined form such as everyday conscious­
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ness. Already Jakobi39 said that “the god that can be thought of is not the orig­
inal God.” In short, it is possible to identify transcendental emotion as the ori­
gin of religion. It functions as the foundation of the transcendent symbol, and, 
at the same time, it is accompanied by transcendental will. Will, in turn, gives 
rise to the religious ought; in other words, it expresses itself in religious rit­
ual.
39 Friedrich Wilhelm Jakobi (1743-1819).
40 Nishida acknowledges here that even the notion of the transcendental demand is cast in 
the form of the symbolic and thus attempts to express the inexpressible.
Because the feeling of devotion indicates the moment where consciousness and 
the inexpressible enter into a real relationship with each other, the former attempts 
to express the non-normative object of transcendental emotion in the form of nor­
mative yet symbolic content. We can thus say that the symbol of the transcendent 
emerges from transcendental emotion. Yet, even the symbolic expression of tran­
scendental emotion appears in the form of an antinomy.
In this sense, the symbol of god organizes what cannot be organized and 
expresses what cannot be expressed. Ironically, god must be symbolized as the 
demand of transcendental emotion, even though it is beyond symbolization.40
Such symbols of the transcendent are accompanied by transcendental desire. 
The reason for this lies in the nature of our knowledge, concerning the concur­
rence of transpersonal energy and mystical life. This knowledge is directly linked 
to the various fluctuations and changes in the axiological life of us human beings. 
And yet, we can detect an opposition similar to the one that appears in theory and 
thought, [even in this form of knowledge].
2. The Relationship of Religion to Scholarship and Morality
As I mentioned above, there are many forms of religion. While all religions 
are based on the demand of life, they express it in various ways. However, 
because there are many forms of religion, we cannot reduce it simply to a sub­
jective fabrication of the human mind. Rather, religious faith must be seen as 
the basis for scholarship and morality. In general, we assume that scholarship 
and morality are not limited to one particular time period but are eternal and 
unchanging principles to which most people can agree. At their very founda­
tion, however, scholarship and morality include ideal faith. If we were to 
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assume that religion is purely subjective because of its plurality, then schol­
arship and morality also have different forms. But we should not lose sight of 
the ought41 that resides inside of the human heart. If it is the case that truth 
has its roots in this ought, even religion, not unlike scholarship and morality, 
must disclose objective truth. In other words, when we talk about “religion,” 
we can identify a variety of forms and, at the same time, one universal essence. 
(The ideal is nothing akin to subjectivity or individuality but constitutes the 
ought, that is, the demand that lies behind this truth. )
41 The term “ought” refers to the Kantian idea that every human individual is bestowed with 
an inherent sense of what is moral. To Nishida, as to Kant, this ought does not counter but 
forms the basis of rationality (in Kant’s case “practical reason”).
The relationship of faith to scholarship and morality:
Both scholarship and morality are based on faith in an ideal and, therefore, on 
an ought.
Let us consider, for example, the case of scholarship. If we think about schol­
arship in pragmatic terms, then truth must be, as Windelband and others have 
noticed correctly, albeit not without flaws in their arguments, based on our desire 
for truth. The same reasoning applies to morality. We cannot even conceive of 
moral rules without postulating a transcendental ought. Our ideals develop sys­
tematically from this ought.
Religion has quarreled with morality and scholarship from ancient times. 
Scholarship has fought religion, and vice versa, but there is no reason that 
religion on one side and scholarship and morality on the other should oppose 
each other. On the contrary, scholarship and morality cannot be conceived of 
unless we assume religion. The essence of religion comprises the union 
between humans and god. God constitutes the objectivity of the cosmos, the 
self its subjectivity. We can thus say that all religious activity is based on, and 
expresses the unity of, subjectivity and objectivity. The union between god 
and humans includes and unites both the subjective and the objective. Again, 
religion marks the unity between subjectivity and objectivity. Now, scholar­
ship, art, and morality require more than a mere unity between subjectivity 
and objectivity. For example, people who are not afraid of committing them­
selves to the true meaning of morality cannot practice righteousness consid­
ering good as subjective or as external. In other words, the good must possess 
the highest value. People, who are committed to the moral ideal, believe that 
they have to discard everything that is not good to attain this goal. This way 
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of thinking is based on the assumption that one has to conceive of the good 
as something that exists in the objective world; an illusion cannot have this 
status. The good thus combines the moments of actuality and potentiality. To 
follow Fichte’s42 thought, the world must be thought of as the actualization 
of morality. Subsequently, it is in religion that I feel the unity of my ideal with 
the universe. Anyone who realizes this unity of subjectivity and objectivity43 
possesses a religious heart regardless of whether or not he/she adheres to an 
established religion. In the same sense, the very notion of scholarship is 
impossible if we assume that knowledge is subjective and disconnected from 
objectivity.44 Scholarly knowledge must possess objective value as well. In 
fact, we produce it when we unite with objective reality; its creation presup­
poses the unity of subject and object. Without this unity, scholarship would 
not be possible. Just as the origin of moral obligation is to be sought in the 
unity of subject and object, the value of scholarship depends on religious faith.
42 Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814).
43 The original translates literally as “anyone who possesses this kind of faith.” But when 
we consider the context of this statement as well as this, as Nishida spells out later in this essay, 
he in general defines “faith” as the unities of opposites, especially subjectivity and objectivi­
ty. This rendition seems to explicate what Nishida implies when he uses the term “faith.” 
Similarly in The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview, Nishida defines faith as “the 
reality that opposes the self objectively” (NKZ, vol. 11, p. 418) and as “grace” (NKZ, vol. 11, 
p. 419) to contrast it with “subjective belief’ (NKZ, vol. 11, p. 418).
44 It does seem strange that Nishida, who identified the intellect as the standpoint of objec­
tivity, suggests now that scholarship is subjective. In some sense, he presents the Kantian and 
phenomenological angle here, according to which even scholarship comprises the subjective 
activity of the self. Nishida argues here that to be released from the solipsism of the self, the 
scholar has to abandon him/herself in faith to reason. This acknowledgment of something 
objective outside the self, Nishida sees symbolized with the theologumenon of the reliance on 
god.
45 Here, Nishida strives to undermine the dichotomy between ideals and reality; once again, 
he claims that both necessitate each other.
The essence of religion is to be found in the unity of god and the self. In other 
words, religion unites objectivity and subjectivity. God constitutes the basis for 
objectivity; without god, neither scholarship nor morality is possible.
A moral person does not simply pretend to search for the good, but seriously 
pursues this quest. Such a person bestows the supreme authority in the world to 
that which possesses the highest value. Moral ideals have to be applicable to what 
is objectively real. The objective world depends on these ideals.45 Without this 
kind of faith [and ideals that are rooted in the objective world], morality is mean­
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ingless. This constitutes religious faith.
The same is the case for scholarship. Not only is knowledge not merely sub­
jective in order to be applicable to the world outside of the self, it must be ground­
ed in objective reality. In short, knowledge must bring objectivity to the fore. As 
is the case with moral obligation, scholarship is not simply grounded in subjec­
tivity, but in the god who forms the unity of subjectivity and objectivity.
Knowledge and morality are not absolute but are determined by the content of 
the highest ideals; the same applies to religion.
Of course, moral law should not be determined by religious authority. If 
that were the case, religion would prevent moral development. Even schol­
arship does not derive its truths from religion. But the basis for the possibil­
ity of morality and scholarship can be found within faith, that is, within the 
unity of subjectivity and objectivity. If both, scholarship and morality, on one 
side, and religion, on the other, guard their domains, they are not in conflict. 
Only when either oversteps its boundaries do they collide. If scholarship and 
morality are [particularized and] appropriated by a specific time period, they 
collide with religion. Conversely, if religion is grasped [and fossilized] at a 
certain moment in time, it collides with scholarship and morality. On the con­
trary, true scholarship and morality purify and deepen religion. The develop­
ment of scholarship does not harm religion. By the same token, the dimension 
of Christianity that was lost when Copernicus46 hypothesized the movement 
of the earth does not constitute the essence of Christianity. Darwin’s recent 
theory of evolution purified religion and removed what was impure about it. 
Religion does not lose its essence because of Darwin’s theory. Even phe­
nomena such as miracles are not necessary to religion. It is more appropriate 
to say that “miracles” emerge from the demand of religious emotion. In the 
famous words of Goethe,47 “miracles are the beloved children of faith.”48 
Since Kepler49 and other scientists like him discovered principles that arouse 
the religious heart, they, rather than the religious fanatics [who rejected their 
discoveries], should be considered to be pure [and religious]. In the same 
sense in which religion is purified by advancements in scholarship, that of 
religion purifies scholarship. Even the likes of Descartes possessed a religious 
heart.
46 Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543).
47 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832).
48 This notorious citation is taken from Goethe’s Faust, Part One, First Scene.
49 Johannes Kepler (1571-1630).
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Of course, morality does not comprise specific duties decreed by religious 
authority; neither does scholarship.50 But the possibility of all knowledge and 
morality is grounded in the faith that unites subjectivity and objectivity. The 
psalmist says “we see the light when we are in the light of god.” Scholarship and 
morality protect the empirical world.51
50 The name “Copernicus” is inserted in parenthesis at this location. NKZ, vol. 15, p. 334.
51 The original reads literally “this world of limitations.”
52 Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727).
53 The title “Tannisho" is inserted in parenthesis at this location. NKZ, vol. 15, p. 335.
Scholarship and morality purify religion. It is impossible for the advancement 
of scholarship to harm religion. On the contrary, scholarship deepens and purifies 
religion. Copernicus’ theory of the movement of the earth removes the impure ele­
ments of religion and, at the same time, promotes religion in its pure form. The 
theory of evolution does not take anything essential away from religion.
Anyone who is inspired to piety and awe by the lawful movement of the heav­
enly bodies, as were Kepler and Newton,52 must be more deeply religious than the 
religious fanatic. Again, in some sense, it is possible to say that we advance in 
scholarship if we have religious faith, just as Descartes did.
The relationship between religion and morality is characterized by mutu­
ality: religion aids morality and vice versa. Morality first develops from its 
roots in religion. Nevertheless, the advancement of morality purifies religion. 
We can say that the pure moralist is more religious than the religious fanat­
ic. Without religious faith there is no morality. A person with a penetrating 
conscience feels infinite awe towards the unlimited normative consciousness 
of morality. This feeling constitutes religion. To say that religion is trans- 
ethical does not imply immorality, but suggests that the goal of religion com­
prises infinite awe towards the normative consciousness.53
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